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This dissertation examines the key attempts at reaching compromise between 
the secessionists of the Southern States and the Republican administration of 
Abraham Lincoln during the Secession Crisis of 1860-61. The question of why 
compromise failed to prevent the Civil War is analysed first in the context of the 
Secession Crisis itself. Then, the nature of an American compromise and 
Constitutional liberty is defined with the work of philosopher George Santayana, 
and an overview of the three main phases of historiography, traditionalist, 
revisionist, and post-revisionist, is provided. After that, the two main strands of 
reasoning behind the long-term failure of compromise, the idea that the North 
and South developed irreconcilable sectional differences that could not be 
compromised over, and the pervasion of dualistic moral abstractions preventing 
reasoned discussion of political issues, are elucidated on. Ultimately, it is 
argued that the failure to reach an enduring compromise stemmed from 
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On the fourteenth of November 1860, Alexander H. Stephens, retired 
representative and future Vice-President of the Confederate States of America, 
gave a speech to the Legislature of Georgia.1 The topic was how Georgia 
should respond to the election of Abraham Lincoln and the ascendancy of the 
Republican Party to the White House. Lincoln had won a close, but definite, 
majority. Yet he had not won a single state in the South.2 The antislavery 
ideology that was central to the Republican platform was fundamentally 
opposed to that of the South, and although it was not abolitionist, radical 
thought dominated the Party; abolishing the evil of slavery was clearly the end 
goal of the Republican ideal.3 Therefore despite Lincoln’s repeated assurances 
that he would not act outside of the Constitution and would not interfere with 
slavery where it already existed, the fact that he represented the antithesis of 
everything proslavery Americans stood for, combined with the slim, sectional 
margin by which he was elected, was enough to sound the klaxons of secession 
amongst the South once again. It is this call for secession that Stephens is 
responding to. His speech, given scarcely a week after Lincoln’s election, does 
not bear any inflammatory secessionist rhetoric. Instead he calls for a 
moderate, reasoned response to what was indisputably a legal, Constitutional 
election. Just because an antislavery man has been elected president did not 
mean that Southerners have to choose between abolition rule and aggressive 
                                            
1 Richard Malcolm Johnson, William Hand Browne, The Life of Alexander H. Stephens, (J. B. 
Lippincott & Co.: Philadelphia, 1878), p. 367 
2 David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis: 1848-1861, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher, (Harper & Row: 
New York, 1976), p. 447 
3 Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the 
Civil War, (Oxford University Press: 1995), p. 214 
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disunion.4 After all, sectional differences had caused strife before: first in 1833 
over the imposition of a tariff favourable to the North but not the South, then in 
the wake of the Mexican War over the expansion of slavery into the newly 
conquered territory.5 On both of these occasions a compromise was reached, 
the compromises of 1833 and 1850 respectively. Radical Southern 
secessionists, colloquially known as fire-eaters, had promoted secession as 
valid response at both of these junctures, arguing that implacable Northern 
interests pervaded Congress and made no consideration towards the needs of 
the South.6 Yet the majority of Southerners did not rally to this cause, and those 
that did succumb to the secession furore quickly came back into the unionist 
fold once a satisfactory compromise had been reached.7 These men and 
women were proud Georgians, Virginians, Mississippians and so forth, but they 
were also proud Americans. They shared a history of revolution, a hatred of 
tyranny, and a love of liberty with their brethren in New York, Massachusetts, 
and Illinois. Although the nature of the Southern economy, culture, and society 
differed from that of the North, the majority of Americans had faith that their 
system of Constitutional Democracy would allow for dissenting views to be 
discussed and synthesized into a mutually beneficial compromise. It is this faith 
that Stephens is appealing to. Lincoln and the Republicans might represent a 
threat to the South if they renege on the tenets of the Georgia Platform, the 
                                            
4 Alexander H. Stephens, ‘Speech before the Legislature of Georgia: Milledgeville, November 
14, 1860’, in Johnson, Richard Malcolm, Browne William Hand, The Life of Alexander H. 
Stephens, (J. B. Lippincott & Co.: Philadelphia, 1878), p. 577 
5 Merrill D. Peterson, Olive Branch and Sword – The Compromise of 1833, (Louisiana State 
University Press: Baton Rouge, 1982), p. 5; Potter, The Impeding Crisis, pp. 113-114 
6 Avery O. Craven, Civil War in the Making: 1815-1860, (Louisiana State University Press: 
Baton Rouge, 1959), pp. 40-42 
7 Potter, The Impending Crisis, p. 128 
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basis on which the Compromise of 1850 was formulated.8 So long as Lincoln 
did not make an unconstitutional act against the South there was no grounds for 
secession.9 Compromise within the Union was not only possible, but it should 
be sought after above and beyond any move towards aggressive disunion. 
 
Methodology 
Yet compromise was not achieved during the Secession Crisis. The spirit of the 
fire-eaters overtook the South and ordinances of secession were adopted in 
quick order.10 Stephens, who spoke so ardently in the name of the Union, 
became Vice-President of the Confederate States of America on the eleventh of 
February 1861.11 Why then did Stephens and so many other Americans, 
Northern and Southern, choose Civil War over compromise during the 
Secession Crisis? That question has not been definitively answered. Why the 
Civil War occurred and precisely how it came about is the subject of a vast 
amount of historiography that shares similar motifs, yet does not reach anything 
close to a complete consensus. It would be audacious for this paper to make 
any claims towards resolving this issue. However through an examination of the 
key schools of Civil War historiography I have identified two main of strands of 
thought in relation to why compromise failed. The first of these is the idea that 
irreconcilable economic, social, and ideological differences developed between 
                                            
8 Stephens, ‘Speech before the Legislature of Georgia: Milledgeville, November 14, 1860’, p. 
568 
9 Ibid., p. 579 
10 For a timeline of the conventions for and ordinances of Secession, see Potter, The Impending 
Crisis, pp. 491-492, 498-499 
11 Rudolph von Abele, Alexander H. Stephens: A Biography, (Alfred A. Knopf Inc.: New York, 
1946), p. 195 
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the Northern and Southern sections and fostered an irrepressible conflict. The 
second holds that compromise should have possible during the Secession 
Crisis, yet was made impossible by the pervasion of dualistic moral abstractions 
throughout American society. In formulating these strands I have first examined 
the main compromise attempts during the Secession Crisis and the localized 
reasons as to why they failed. Then I have defined exactly what constitutes an 
American compromise through the use of the work of Brazilian-American 
philosopher George Santayana. After a brief overview of the three main phases 
of historiography, traditionalist, revisionist, and post-revisionist, I have examined 
the two main strands that offer an explanation to the failure of compromise. 
Both of these strands are found within scholarship that deals with long term 
issues in ante-bellum American history as well as works that focus on the 
Secession Crisis. Therefore it is necessary to analyse the underlying causes of 
the Civil War in order to reach a conclusion on the historiographical treatment of 
compromise as a whole. The objective of this paper is not to definitively resolve 
the origins of the Civil War, nor to answer exactly why American congressmen 
rejected compromise during the Secession Crisis. However it does aim to 
illuminate the historiographical response as to why compromise, one of the 
most crucial and admired elements of American Constitutionalism, did not 




Crittenden and Corwin: The Compromises of the 
Secession Crisis 
The failure of compromise cannot be attributed to a lack of trying. The one 
hundred and fifty-seven days from Lincoln’s election on November sixth 1860 to 
the Confederate bombardment of Fort Sumter on April twelfth 1861 saw a 
number of attempts at reaching a compromise, the vast majority of which were 
deemed unacceptable to both fire-eaters and Republicans, and were not 
discussed outside the halls of Congress.12 However the compromise proposal 
of Kentucky senator John J. Crittenden did have terms that had a realistic 
chance of halting disunion. It proposed a number of constitutional amendments 
that could potentially allay Southern fears of Lincoln taking unconstitutional 
actions towards the South. The execution of the Fugitive Slave Law, the inability 
of Congress to abolish slavery in places where it already exists, and the 
extension of slavery to all territories below the latitude 36° 30' currently held and 
hereafter acquired by the United States were to be enshrined within the 
Constitution, and Congress was to be unable to interfere with these 
amendments.13 These conditions, in particular the unlimited extension of 
slavery, were the only ones that the fire-eaters found agreeable. Lincoln and the 
Republicans however, did not. To permanently enshrine the extension of 
slavery within the Constitution meant giving up the entire Republican platform 
                                            
12 David M. Potter, Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis, (Louisiana State University 
Press: Baton Rouge, 1970), p. 47 
13 ‘Amendments Proposed in Congress by Senator John J. Crittenden: December 18, 1860’, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/critten.asp, last accessed 10 Oct. 2014 
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and sabotaging the antislavery morals that they held to be self-evident truths.14 
Therefore it could not be part of a true compromise; the fire-eaters were asking 
too much of the Republicans. 
 
This fact dominated the Senate Committee of Thirteen that was called to 
discuss the validity of Crittenden’s proposal which met on the twentieth of 
December 1860. The Southern congressmen who were sent, Jefferson Davis 
and Robert Toombs, would not vote in favour of Crittenden’s plan unless a 
majority of the Republicans did so, given their history of immovable antislavery 
opposition to any compromise measure.15 The five Republican senators 
followed the lead of William H. Seward, the de facto leader of the Party before 
Lincoln’s inauguration on the fourth of March 1861. He had just received word 
of Lincoln’s policy regarding the territories (‘Entertain no proposition in regard to 
the extension of slavery.’) and as such led his contingent in unanimously voting 
down the proposal.16 The other members of the committee consisted of three 
senators from Kentucky (including Crittenden himself) and three Northern 
Democrats. Of these men, only Crittenden and two others were universally 
behind the compromise; two of the Democrats sided with the Southerners in not 
voting in favour of the compromise unless the Republicans did so.17 Seward did 
put forward compromise terms that would be acceptable to the Republicans, yet 
because they did not make a decisive ruling on the extension of slavery they 
were dismissed by the Southerners as another half-hearted effort at 
                                            
14 Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, p. 40  
15 Potter, Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis, p. 171 
16 Abraham Lincoln, ‘Letter to William Kellogg, Dec. 11 1860’, The Collected Works of Abraham 
Lincoln Vol. IV, ed. Roy P. Basler, (Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, 1953), p. 150 
17 Potter, Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis, pp. 110-111 
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conciliation.18 Because of this an agreement could not be reached, and the 
commission reported back to the Senate on the last day of 1860 that it had 
disbanded and could give no recommendations regarding compromise.19 
 
Other attempts at formulating a compromise were made in the months leading 
up to Fort Sumter, most notably the compromise of Representative Thomas 
Corwin of Ohio and the efforts of the February Peace Conference held in 
Virginia. The latter was rendered irrelevant by the complete absence of any 
Southern delegates; several states had already seceded at this point and were 
past considering a compromise within the Union.20 The former, created within 
the Committee of Thirty-Three (the House of Representatives’ equivalent of the 
Committee of Thirteen) appeared to be viable on paper. Indeed, its policy of 
admitting New Mexico Territory immediately as a slave state was put forward by 
the Republicans and therefore ostensibly not effected by the political 
manoeuvring that plagued the Committee of Thirteen.21 Unfortunately it was 
never designed to be an enduring compromise because it did not secure the 
resolution of the territorial issue that the Southerner’s sought. As it stands the 
Corwin Compromise was meant more to shift the blame for refusing to 
compromise away from the Republicans and on to the Southern 
representatives.22 This was a fairly obvious political ploy. Although the Corwin 
Compromise did reach Congress in the heavily modified form of the Corwin 
                                            
18 Walter Stahr, Seward: Lincoln’s Indispensable Man, (Simon & Schuster: New York, 2012), p. 
218 
19 Ibid. 
20 Potter, The Impending Crisis, pp. 550-551 
21 Kenneth M. Stampp, And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 1860-61, 
(University of Chicago Press: 1968), p. 129 
22 Ibid., pp. 173-175 
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Amendment (which would have prevented Congress from interfering with 
‘domestic institutions’ such as slavery) it was never ratified and ultimately did 
nothing to prevent disunion.23 
 
The Nature of the American Compromise 
Contextualized within the one hundred and fifty-seven days of the Secession 
Crisis, it is easy to attach the failure of the Crittenden and Corwin compromises 
to the stubborn refusal of Southern and Northern congressmen to give up some 
of the more dogmatic elements of their ideals in the name of the Union. It is also 
tempting to describe the failure of compromise as the failure of the entire 
American political system. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, 
the three founding fathers who authored the Federalist Papers (which analysed 
the potential positive and negative effects of the Constitutional Union) predicted 
the possibility of factional strife and the crippling effect it could have on the 
representative government. Federalist No. Ten in particular argued that 
democracy under the Constitution would prevent the need for armed revolution 
by always facilitating compromise in the name of the nation.24 Clearly this did 
not happen in the Secession Crisis. Yet both of these answers are not correct in 
their entirety. For neither the Crittenden nor the Corwin Compromise were 
American compromises as the Founder’s envisioned.  
 
                                            
23 Potter, The Impending Crisis, pp. 550-551 
24 James Madison, ‘The Federalist Papers: No. 10’, New York Packet, 23 Nov. 1787, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp, last accessed 10 Oct. 2014; see also 
Stampp, And the War Came, p. 35 
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What then, comprises an American compromise? And why is it so crucial to the 
spirit American liberty? Brazilian-American philosopher George Santayana 
provides the answer to these questions. He defines the American compromise 
as people ‘. . . meet[ing] in a genuine spirit of consultation, eager to persuade 
but ready to be persuaded . . . it is implicitly agreed, in every case, that disputed 
questions shall be put to a vote, and that the minority will loyally acquiesce in 
the decision of the majority and build henceforth upon it, without a thought of 
ever retracting it.’25 Already this casts doubt over the validity of the Crittenden 
and Corwin compromises, as in both cases Northerners and Southerners 
lacked a completely genuine spirit in regards to formulating an agreeable 
solution to disunion. However it is Santayana’s definition of liberty that is most 
relevant in explaining why these compromises failed: 
‘The practice of liberty presupposes two things: that all concerned are 
fundamentally unanimous, and that each has a plastic nature, which he is 
willing to modify. If fundamental unanimity is lacking and all are not making in 
the same general direction, there can be no honest co-operation, no satisfying 
compromise. Every concession, under such circumstances, would be a 
temporary one . . . it would amount to a mutilation of one’s essential nature, a 
partial surrender of life, liberty, and happiness, tolerable for a time, perhaps, as 
the lesser of two evils, but involving a perpetual sullen opposition and hatred.’26 
In the space of a paragraph, Santayana has identified heart of the failure of 
compromise. The North and the South were fundamentally unanimous on the 
ideals of liberty, democracy, and the pursuit of happiness, but not slavery.  
                                            
25 George Santayana, Character & Opinion in the United States, (New York: George Braziller, 
1955), p. 110 




The Founding Fathers however were unanimous on the evil of slavery. Yet 
because they looked forward to future generations to gradually remove the 
system from the United States they did not specifically state this in the 
Constitution.27 Yet neither did they enshrine it as a fundamental value of 
American democracy. Because of this, slavery was left in a purposely 
ambiguous state in the Constitution; the Three Fifths Clause allowed for slaves 
to be vicariously represented in electoral votes, but there is no specific 
reference to slavery in the Constitution itself.28 It is this fundamental ambiguity 
in regards to slavery within the Constitution that allowed Northerners and 
Southerners to develop two opposite, yet similar, debateable, yet justifiable, 
interpretations of American liberty. Stephens can claim that the Republicans are 
taking unconstitutional action towards the South in limiting the extension of 
slavery, because in his interpretation Southerners have the Constitutional right 
to take their property in slaves wherever they wish in the Union and its 
prospective Territories. Conversely, Lincoln can also claim, in response to 
Stephens’ speech to the Legislature of Georgia, that the only substantial 
difference between them was that ‘You think slavery is right and ought to be 
extended; while we think it is wrong and ought to be abolished.’29 Lincoln is not 
being unreasonably deterministic here, placing personal morality above the 
reality of reaching a compromise and preventing disunion. He is presenting his 
interpretation of Constitutional Liberty, which he believes coincides with the 
                                            
27 Charles Grier Sellers, ‘The Travail of Slavery’, The Southerner as an American, ed. Charles 
Grier Sellers, (University of North Carolina Press: 1960), p. 45 
28 ‘The United States Constitution, Article One, Section Two, Clause Three’, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/art1.asp, last accessed 10 Oct. 2014 
29 Abraham Lincoln, ‘Letter to Alexander H. Stephens, Dec. 22 1860’, The Collected Works of 




Founder’s. Namely, that slavery is morally wrong. This is the ideal that guided 
Lincoln and the Republicans during the Secession Crisis. The Founding 
Father’s purposely left this fact ambiguous in the Constitution, but in the 
Lincoln’s view that was because they did not envisage a place for slavery in 
their more perfect union.30 Stephens, and the Southerners that would eventually 
vote for secession, thought otherwise. Slavery was not necessarily a moral 
institution, but in the Southern interpretation of the Constitution the right to hold 
slaves was a guaranteed truth under American liberty. Because both of these 
views were held to be fundamental to Northern and Southern ideology 
respectively, and were ultimately drawn from the same source of the 
Constitution, they could not be compromised on. Santayana again provides a 
succinct explanation of this: ‘In a hearty and sound democracy all questions at 
issue must be minor matters; fundamentals must have been silently agreed 
upon and taken for granted when the democracy arose [my italics].’31 Slavery 
was most certainly not a minor matter. Because its status within the United 
States was left ambiguous at the founding of the Union, the North and the South 
were free to develop conflicting interpretations towards it over the course of the 
nineteenth century.32 These interpretations, despite being grounded in the same 
fundamental American ideal of liberty, eventually grew more and more 
incompatible, until they were solidified as indisputable truths. This made a long-
term American compromise all but impossible during the Secession Crisis, and 
as such forms the basis of the irreconcilable differences and moral abstraction 
strands that are evident in historiography. 
                                            
30 Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, pp. 214-216 
31 Santayana, Character & Opinion in the United States, p. 115 
32 Kenneth Stampp, The Imperiled Union: Essays on the Background of the Civil War, (Oxford 




In order to understand the reasoning behind the formulation of each strand, it is 
necessary to have a basic knowledge of the three main schools of Civil War 
historiography: the traditionalist, revisionist, and post-revisionist. The focus of 
this paper is on the latter two schools, as traditionalism covers a wide period of 
works from the onset of the Civil War until the 1930’s. During this span of 
almost a century the historiography went through considerable phases of 
development, evolving from biased war time propaganda to empiricist accounts 
that attempted to present unbiased interpretations whilst reducing the conflict to 
a single identifiable cause.33 The overall traditionalist conclusion in regards to 
the possibility of compromise however does not deviate from the theory of 
irrepressible conflict. In light of this I have included the traditionalist school in 
order to contextualize the revisionist and post-revisionist response to it, but I 
have not examined the specific historians within it with as much detail. Yet it is 
necessary to provide a cursory overview. For this I am indebted to Thomas J. 
Pressly’s monograph Americans Interpret their Civil War, which gives an 
excellent description of the evolution of traditionalism. Although their exact 
method and conclusions in regards to the causation of the Civil War differ, the 
traditionalist, revisionist and post-revisionist schools all provide evidence to both 
the irreconcilable differences and moral abstraction arguments regarding the 
failure of compromise. 
                                            





It is the view of the traditionalist school that the Civil War was the result of an 
irrepressible conflict that could not have been prevented by any measure of 
compromise or even outright conciliation. Indeed, the conclusion of this first 
phase of historiography can be reduced to the idea that the sectional 
differences between the North and the South were simply too great to be 
overcome by any method other than warfare. Not only would it have been 
wrong to compromise in 1861, it would have been nothing more than a 
xtemporary measure against irreconcilable sectional conflict.34 H. E. Von Holst, 
one of the founders of traditionalism, in particular is quite critical of past 
compromise attempts, describing them as ‘. . . concessions to the slavepower . . 
. that slowly converted the national government into an instrument of its own 
will.’35 Regardless of whether the immoral institution of slavery, a multitude of 
sectional incompatibilities, or economic determinism is emphasized as the 
primary cause, traditionalists view the Civil War as an irrepressible conflict and 
as such dismiss compromise as an option during the Secession Crisis. 
 
Revisionists 
The revisionist school disagrees with this view. They still believe that 
compromise was not an option in the immediate days before the Civil War, yet 
not necessarily because it was always destined to fail as a result of 
irreconcilable differences. The idea of Southern nationalism, although ‘long in 
                                            
34 Ibid., p. 226 
35 Ibid., p. 75 
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the making’ only coalesced during the Secession Crisis after all, and even 
though disagreements over tariffs and the extension of slavery had heightened 
sectional tensions, the maintenance of the Union had always been the 
motivating factor towards choosing compromise instead of conflict.36 Prominent 
revisionists J. T. Randall, Charles W. Ramsdell, and Avery O. Craven argue 
that this desire amongst Southerners (and indeed, the majority of Americans) to 
work out sectional differences within the framework of the Union did not simply 
disappear in the wake of Lincoln’s election.37 However the adoption of radical 
antislavery views as the foundation of the Republican Party, and the dogmatic 
insistence of Republicans to regard the ideology of the South as unequivocally 
evil because it was based on slavery, prevented the views of the moderate 
Americans from being expressed.38 Slavery could have been compromised 
over, had the North not been clouded by the reduction of slavery to an abstract 
issue of right and wrong. Indeed, the key factor behind the failure of 
compromise was the fact that such abstractions proliferated Congress during 
the nineteenth century and promoted a culture of extremist antagonism rather 
than moderate cooperation.39 
 
Post-Revisionists 
From the middle of the twentieth century onwards a new school of scholarship 
emerged, that of the post-revisionists. As their name implies, these historians 
wrote in response to the revisionists, critiquing their accusatory claim that 
                                            
36 Avery O. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism 1845-1861, (Louisiana State 
University Press: 1953), p. 390 
37 J. G. Randall, ‘The Civil War Restudied’, Journal of Southern History, VI (1940), p. 451 
38 Craven, Civil War in the Making, p. 37 
39 Ibid., p. 91 
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Northern Republicans bear the most responsibility for the failure of compromise. 
Indeed, the antislavery ideals of the North were not pursued in the abstract in 
order to frustrate Southern political efforts. Rather, they were a true reflection of 
the morality of the average Northern constituent.40 Eric Foner is the foremost 
proponent of this view, specifically in regards to the failure of compromise.41 
However the post-revisionists form a far less cohesive school than the 
traditionalists or revisionists. Indeed, it is less of a school and more of a broad 
classification of the current phase of historiography. It includes the works of 
transitional revisionists such as Kenneth Stampp and David M. Potter, who do 
not solely blame the Republicans as the revisionists do but still emphasize the 
fact that compromise should have been possible, even if the circumstances 
could not have been less conducive towards it.42  
 
The ideological interpretation of Eugene D. Genovese also fits under the post-
revisionist banner. Writing in response to the economic determinist theory of 
Charles Beard, Genovese argues that simply saying slavery was the cause of 
the Civil War is not enough; yes, it was a critical element both in the real and 
the abstract, but the main reason why it is so crucial to the irreconcilable 
differences theory is that it forms the economic base of Southern society.43 An 
entirely separate civilization developed in the South from the base of slavery, 
complete with its own valid class structure, relations of production, and 
                                            
40 Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, p. 59, p. 61 
41 Ibid., p. 316 
42 Stampp, And the War Came, pp. 297-298; Potter, The Impending Crisis, pp. 522-23, p. 583 
43 Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy & Society of the Slave 
South, (Pantheon Books: New York, 1966), p. 13 
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ideology.44 From this base a hierarchical class structure developed that was 
neither feudal nor bourgeoisie but a synthesis of capitalist and prebourgeois 
ideologies.45 This uniquely Southern ideology represents a completely valid 
superstructure. Distinct from the bourgeois industrial society of the North, the 
South had a different set of parameters it needed to progress (specifically 
relating to the reform of the relations of production without upsetting the class 
hierarchy) which were bound to cause conflict with the North.46 In Genovese’s 
view this was the only possible outcome within the framework of historical 
materialism, therefore a true, permanent compromise was never going to be a 
realistic option. Foner also reaches this conclusion by taking an ideological, but 
not strictly Marxist, approach to why compromise did not occur. By focusing on 
the antislavery, free market ideology of the Republican Party and how it 
accurately represents the traditional Northern middle class of small scale, 
economically independent producers, Foner illustrates how the Northern idea of 
progress clashed with the South’s.47 In essence, Genovese represents the 
definitive Marxist interpretation of the ante-bellum South whereas Foner 
provides a more refined ideological approach unbound by historical materialism. 
                                            
44 Eugene D. Genovese, “Marxian Interpretations of the Slave South” in Towards a New Past: 
Dissenting Essays in American History, ed. Barton J. Bernstein, (Chatto & Windus: London, 
1970), p. 100 
45 Ibid., p. 112 
46 Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery, p. 8 




Irreconcilable Differences, or the Irrepressible 
Conflict 
The first trend within historiography is the idea that compromise was simply 
impossible because of irreconcilable sectional differences. Although 
Northerners and Southerners shared a common heritage and identity as liberal 
Americans, over the course of the nineteenth century they developed distinctly 
different interpretations as to exactly what this identity meant. They remained 
united behind the idea that the United States symbolized the pinnacle of the 
civilized world; no other nation possessed the unique form of Constitutional 
democracy that allowed for the accurate representation and prosperity of its 
citizens.48 One would be extremely hard-pressed to find an ante-bellum 
American, Northern or Southern, who disagreed with the fundamental ideals of 
liberty, prosperity, and progress. Yet if this was the case, it comes across as 
slightly unusual of William H. Seward, de facto leader of the Republican Party 
whilst Lincoln was staying in Springfield before his inauguration, to proclaim in 
1858 that the nation was heading towards ‘. . . an irrepressible conflict between 
opposing and enduring forces [that] means that the United States must and will, 
sooner or later, become entirely either a slave-holding nation, or entirely a free-
labor nation.’49 He goes on to say in the same speech that all sectional 
compromises over slavery, past and future, are rendered ‘vain and ephemeral’ 
by the failure to recognize that two sectional systems of labour cannot exist in 
                                            
48 Stampp, The Imperiled Union, p. 30 
49 William H. Seward, ‘Speech Delivered at Rochester, Monday, Oct. 25, 1858’, 
https://archive.org/details/irrepressiblecon00insewa, last accessed 10 Oct. 2014  
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harmony under one nation.50 This display of fervent determinism casts some 
doubt over the sincerity of Seward’s pursuit of compromise in the Secession 
Crisis. However it also forms the basis of the irreconcilable differences strand of 
historiography in regards to compromise. The opposing systems of labour, free, 
capitalist wage labour in the North and slavery in the South, were able to 
coexist in the early years of the Union because the path by which the United 
States was to progress territorially, economically, and ideologically had not 
been explicitly and formally defined.51 As a result, each section developed 
different interpretations of what progress was. Both were arguably valid under 
the Constitution and each reflected different elements of American liberty. Yet 
this only exacerbated sectional conflict, as both Northerners and Southerners 
could assert that their definition of progress was right based on the tenets of the 
Founding Fathers. While this is technically true, the fact that the United States 
was moving towards a more connected whole through the expansion of 
railroads and advance of industry meant that the strife caused by sectional 
ideologies was increasingly brought into open.52 
 
The issues of territorial, economic, and ideological progress are fundamentally 
linked, therefore it makes sense to examine their role in promoting the 
irrepressible conflict in unison. The principles of this argument hold that all 
Americans believed the United States was an enlightened nation with a 
manifest destiny to progress beyond its current borders and serve as a shining 
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example of the ideal modern, liberal civilization for the rest of the world.53 Yet 
the exact form this progressive expansion should take differed between each 
section. Furthermore, both the free-labour and slave-labour systems required 
access to expand into the Territories in order to sustain the respective societies 
from whence they came. The Northern system of free-labour required access to 
the Territories in order to secure economic and social progress. However the 
nature of this progress differed greatly from that of the South’s, so much so that 
each territory could not operate under free and slave labour simultaneously.54 
Foner provides the basis of this argument. Even though he is the staunchest of 
the post-revisionists in defending the moral right of the Republicans in opposing 
the extension of slavery, his economic interpretation regarding the free-labour 
system of the North adds credence to the irreconcilable difference 
interpretation.55 
 
The need for reform in the slave based economy was a constant, lingering 
concern in the South.56 The inefficiency of slave-labour, the destructive impact it 
had on farmland, and the danger of relying on a select few, undiversified crops 
were compelling reasons to reform the Southern economy.57 Indeed, these 
defects in the plantation system had made the South susceptible to the 
economic downturns of 1819 and 1837, which had significant negative 
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consequences for Southern society as a whole.58 However it is precisely this 
close link between Southern society and slavery that made it so difficult to 
reform. Indeed, Genovese interprets the irreconcilable differences of North and 
South as resulting from the inability of class-conscious slaveholders to commit 
to a process of economic reform that would not weaken their position at the top 
of society.59 This resulted in the Marxian irony of a prebourgeois, aristocratic 
uprising against the bourgeoisie in the name of securing the ideal method of 
economic reform, the unrestricted expansion of slavery.60 
 
Although there may not have been the strict class hierarchy that Genovese 
applies through historical materialism, there is no doubt that the society of the 
South built and sustained itself around a slave economy.61 Plantation owners 
saw the potential benefits of scaling down the domination of the traditional 
plantation in favour of promoting industrialisation and urbanisation. Yet they 
also realized that even a gradual move away from the ‘king cotton’ mentality 
entailed a number of potentially dangerous consequences (the social mobility of 
slaves and poor whites chief amongst these), and a concentrated effort would 
almost certainly result in their displacement as political elite.62 Because of this 
only extremely small scale reforms, based around the maintenance and 
extension of slavery (keeping North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia as 
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slave producing states to sell to the Territories) were eventually adopted.63 
However, this conservative restructure of the economy relied on new markets to 
sell slaves to. Without the freedom to extend slavery into the Territories, this 
scheme becomes little more than a temporary stop-gap in keeping slavery 
economically viable.64 The slaveholders, faced with a choice between extensive 
reform with unpredictable social consequences or fighting to maintain their way 
of life, chose the latter during the Secession Crisis. 
 
There is no doubt that the issue of governing a culturally united but 
economically separated nation served as a major catalyst for each sectional 
crisis. Indeed, the first instance of sectional compromise, the compromise of 
1833, dealt with a high tariff on imported goods that benefited the bourgeoning 
manufactories of the North but put undue strain on the less industrial South.65 
The compromise of 1850 was more about the political power that could be 
gained or lost through the extension of slavery into the Western Territories of 
Kansas, Nebraska, and New Mexico, yet because the growth of each respective 
labour system relied on being able to freely expand into these territories an 
argument can be made for the existence of an underlying economic cause for 
them as well.66 In the slaveholder’s interpretation they had been campaigning 
for their Constitutional right to take their property in slaves wherever they 
wished, be it states within the Union or prospective territories, almost since the 
inception of the Union itself. This is not to say that the Northern states had been 
aggressively attacking the South in Congress over this matter for that long. 
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Rather, it is a manifestation of Stephens’ view that the compromises of 1833 
and 1850 represented scenarios where Northerners and Southerners had 
agreed to abide by certain conditions in the name of preserving the Union, yet 
the North had consistently violated their side of the compromise by insisting on 
an end to slavery.67  In this light, Seward’s firm belief in inevitable sectional 
conflict comes across as evidence of the North’s implacability when it comes to 
compromise over slavery.  
 
Therefore the view that pervaded the South in the Secession Crisis that 
compromise with the North (and especially the Republicans) was a futile effort 
is not wholly ungrounded. Indeed, the Secession Crisis was not the first time 
that sectional antagonisms had threatened the Union. South Carolina had come 
to the brink of seceding once before in 1832 over the perceived 
unconstitutionality of the protectionist economic system.68 Secession, supported 
primarily by South Carolinian fire-eater John C. Calhoun, appeared to a viable 
solution in the face of extremely high tariffs on imported goods imposed in 1828, 
which were designed to promote American manufacturing and foster an 
independent economy, but clearly favoured burgeoning Northern industrialism 
over Southern producer economies that relied heavily on trade with England.69 
Yet despite divergent interests and a significant portion of South Carolinians 
being in favour of secession, the overwhelming opinion of the majority of 
Southerners was that remaining in the Union was by far the better option and all 
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avenues towards this end should be pursued.70 This led to the compromise of 
1833, where the protectionists, represented by Henry Clay, agreed to gradually 
lower the tariff to a more moderate level over the next decade in exchange for 
the repeal of the Ordinance of Nullification.71 Although this did not solve the 
undercurrent of sectional antagonism, nor whether the right to secede was 
guaranteed by the Constitution, it did show that compromise in the name of the 
Union was possible. Not all Southerners were radical fire-eaters looking for any 
opportunity to secede; if Northern congressmen were willing to modify their 
sectional proposals to be more considerate of Southern interests than 
Southerners were willing to do the same for the North.72 
 
Such was the case with the Compromise of 1833, as well as the Compromise of 
1850. Secession was again considered as a course of action in response to the 
Wilmot Proviso’s restriction of the expansion of slavery into the Western 
Territories, yet after the possibility of a monolithic ruling on the institution was 
ruled out compromise became infinitely more favourable.73 Rather than rallying 
behind a declaration that directly opposed Northern interests (as the Ordinance 
of Nullification did) the majority of Southerners chose to support the Georgia 
Platform, which stated that as long as the Fugitive Slave Law was upheld and 
the Constitutionality of slavery was respected, then they would be open to 
reaching a middle ground with the North.74 The form of the Compromise of 1850 
that reached Congress conceded on both of these grounds, therefore the 
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admission of California as a free state and the banning of the slave trade in 
Washington D. C. was acceptable.75 Of course this was nowhere as definitive a 
conclusion to the issue of slavery as the Wilmot Proviso or the original 
compromise proposed by Henry Clay was, and it barely passed in a Congress 
dominated by staunch antislavery and proslavery factions, yet this does not 
change the fact that a compromise was reached in the wake of intense 
sectional rivalry.76 Therefore in the view of the post-revisionists the 
compromises of 1833 and 1850 do not necessarily represent the history of 
success that Stephens attributes to them. They were successful in preventing 
secession (and in 1850 delaying the Civil War) however they did not resolve the 
fundamental ambiguities within the Constitution that ultimately caused them. 
This meant that while conflict was averted in the short term, there was nothing 
stopping the same divergent sectional interpretations of the Constitution from 
causing issues in the future.  
 
A Question of Morality 
The idea of moral abstractions overshadowing the reality of the causes of 
sectional strife and making any attempt to resolve them impossible is the 
second strand in historiography relating to the failure of compromise. Reducing 
such complex issues as slavery and Constitutional interpretation to a simple 
question of right and wrong made it incredibly difficult to discuss them in a 
reasoned manner and reach a compromise. There was nothing wrong with a 
congressman’s morals or those of his electorate factoring into his actions in 
                                            
75 Ibid., p. 114 
76 Ibid., pp. 112-114 
28 
 
Congress, yet it was considered unethical to make these morals the centre of 
congressional debates or an entire political platform.77 The introduction of this 
personal morality, defined by certain undebatable truths (such as the evil of 
slavery) into the political system sabotaged any attempts at compromise.78 
Craven outlines the reasoning behind this view quite aptly: ‘Men could 
compromise tariffs, internal improvements, and land programs; they must die for 
the preservation of their way of life, their ideals, and what they perceived to be a 
civilization.’79 With this quote he also captures the spirit Stephens evoked in his 
speech before the Georgia Legislature. Stephens, a moderate man in favour of 
the Union, could look back in 1860 on the history of sectional compromise with 
approval; overcoming sectional differences in the name of the Union through 
compromise was infinitely preferable to disunion and war. Yet if Lincoln, the 
Republicans, or anyone else threatened the ideals that the South held to be 
right, than he was he would be willing to fight to defend them, especially if the 
citizens of Georgia voted for such an action in a convention.80 This is exactly 
what occurred in the Secession Crisis. The respective conventions considering 
secession may not have passed with an overwhelming majority in every single 
state yet they voted in its favour nonetheless.81 No longer did South Carolina 
stand alone as in 1833; by February the entirety of the South was united in 
disunion. The citizens of the South had exercised their popular sovereignty and 
rallied behind the radical fire-eaters. However this does not mean the majority of 
Southerners thought slavery was a moral institution. On the contrary, they 
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realized that the peculiar institution went against their ideals of liberty and 
universal Christian love for your fellow man.82 The fact that Thomas Jefferson, 
the pinnacle figure of traditional Southern agrarian culture, recognized the evil 
of slavery and shared the view of the Founding Fathers that it had no place in 
the Union was not lost on Southerners, particularly slaveholders.83 Despite this, 
as Charles Grier Sellers rightly asserts that ‘A whole generation cannot 
transform its fundamental values by a mere effort of will.’84 Although 
slaveholders understood the hypocrisy of believing in liberty for all men whilst 
existing off the labour of slaves, they could not see a way to remove slavery 
without upsetting the very fabric of their society.85 In this sense the moral 
abstraction argument intersects with the irreconcilable differences theory. But 
rather than emphasizing economic factors, it is conflicted morality that serves as 
the basis of sectional antagonism. 
 
However, the leaders of the Confederacy did not seek a war of aggression with 
the Union. But they were determined to defend what they saw as their right to 
live under their interpretation of Constitutional liberty.86 Likewise, Lincoln did not 
wish to incite a destructive war, but he also did not believe the right for a state 
to secede from the Union at will was guaranteed by the constitution. Nor for that 
matter was the protection and extension of slavery. Lincoln had clearly outlined 
his stance on this matter during his debates with proslavery Democrat Stephen 
A. Douglas: 
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‘The Republican Party hold that this government was instituted to secure the 
blessings of freedom, and that slavery is an unqualified evil to the negro, to the 
white man, to the soil, and to the State. Regarding it as an evil, they will not 
molest it in the States where it exists . . . ; but they will use every constitutional 
method to prevent the evil from becoming larger . . .’87 
Lincoln reiterated this opinion again whilst he awaited his inauguration, directing 
all who sought his view on compromise towards his past speeches. His 
response to Stephens’ speech reinforces this view as well: 
‘Do the people of the South really entertain fears that a Republican 
administration would, directly or indirectly interfere with the slaves or with them 
about the slaves? If they do, I wish to assure you . . . that there is no cause for 
such fears. The South would be in no more danger than in the days of 
Washington. I suppose, however, that does not meet the case. You think 
slavery is right and ought to be extended; while we think it is wrong and ought 
to be abolished. That, I suppose . . . is the only substantial difference between 
us.’88 
While Lincoln assures Stephens that he will not interfere slavery as it exists, an 
argument can be made that he is being deterministic and reductionist by 
ignoring the reality of preserving the Union in favour of abstract moral 
absolutism. However it is far more likely that Lincoln is emphasizing that despite 
the sectional differences that divided North and South, they were all still 
Americans united under the Constitution. The other factor that is important to 
note here is that thinking slavery should be abolished does not make Lincoln a 
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radical abolitionist. It is true that abolitionist sentiment was stronger among 
some Republicans more than others and greatly influenced the antislavery 
ideal. Despite this, active abolition was not the objective of the Republican 
Party.89 Rather, their goal was that of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, 
Alexander Hamilton and the other Founding Fathers: the gradual end of slavery. 
Therefore there could be no compromise over the extension of slavery. 
 
This is reflected in the traditionalist school. Indeed, the earliest incarnations of 
the moral abstraction argument are found within, represented in the writings of 
men who lived through the Civil War. As such they are heavily influenced by the 
partisan opinions held during the war. Affixing war guilt is the primary concern of 
these works; the issues surrounding compromise are not dealt with in detail, yet 
in the quest to justify the war a strand of thought exists that still defines modern 
historiography: the immorality of slavery.90 Southern authors of this period were 
united behind Jefferson Davis’ interpretation of the war as the fault of the North, 
justifying secession through state sovereignty and asserting that the conflict 
was not centred around slavery.91 However it is the Northern accounts that 
shape traditionalism in regards to compromise. The North is characterized as 
succeeding in a great moral struggle, fighting for true freedom against the evil of 
slavery. Slaveholders as opposed to Southerners are singled out as the guilty 
party, for they deceived the Southern states into a rebellion in the name of 
defending the source of their prosperity.92 This idea of a conspiracy of Southern 
leaders can be seen as a method of encouraging national unity during the 
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reconstruction by absolving the majority of Southerners from direct 
responsibility for the war. However it does not detract from the main argument 
that the South aggressively rebelled to protect slavery and the North was right 
in fighting to bring about the destruction of the institution.93 Therefore it is the 
view of the early Northern traditionalists that slavery could not and should not 
have been compromised over.  
 
Craven and Stampp disagree with this interpretation. They believe that 
compromise should have been possible but was made impossible by this very 
reduction of complex issues such as slavery, state’s rights, and national 
progress to extreme moral dualisms that obscured the true nature of these 
issues and prevented the formulation of a true compromise.94 Although both 
Northern and Southern congressmen fell prey to these abstractions, the 
majority of the blame is placed on Northern Republicans who let the radical 
elements of antislavery ideology dominate their party platform.95 In this sense, 
the revisionists are placing the blame for the Civil War squarely at the feet of the 
Republicans, although they do not state this explicitly. Randall comes the 
closest to directly indicting the Republican Party, claiming that they brought the 
cause of radical abolitionism into politics without any real desire to settle it.96 He 
does not deny that the emotions surrounding antislavery were very much real 
and justified; rather, he argues that the slavery issue was largely fabricated and 
certainly not the sole cause of the Civil War.97 The reality of slavery in 1860 was 
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‘. . . trivial as to interests that were in fact threatened; yet . . . tragically important 
as a popular and political troublemaker.’98 The interests that Randall is referring 
to in this instance are those directly pertaining to the preservation of the Union. 
Slavery, especially the status of slavery in the territories, is regarded more as 
the battleground of sectional differences in the abstract sense as opposed to 
being a realistic issue in the Secession Crisis.99 Although Randall does not 
explain in great detail his reasoning behind this view, his meaning and that of 
the revisionist school as a whole becomes more illuminated when 
contextualized with that of Charles W. Ramsdell. Ramsdell explores the reality 
of slavery in the decade leading up to the Civil War and the feasibility of its 
expansion into the territories, as well as the likelihood of the institution’s survival 
had the Civil War not destroyed it.100 He concluded that by 1860 slavery was a 
cumbersome and unprofitable economic system that could only sustain itself if it 
had a steady supply of new land to cultivate. Because the Western Territories 
were wholly unsuited to growing cotton slavery could not possibly expand there, 
therefore whether or not it was allowed in the territories was a moot point.101 
Slavery had undeniably reached its apex and could only decline, especially in 
the face of growing Northern resistance to the institution. Indeed, if the 
Republicans had not taken the initiative and brought about the destruction of 
slavery by force, Ramsdell predicted that within a generation slavery would 
have ceased to exist within the Union.102 This is what Randall means when he 
refers to slavery as ‘trivial’ to the interests of preserving the Union. The intense 
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agitation behind the abstraction that is the morality of slavery obfuscated the 
reality of the institution’s inevitable, natural demise. By adopting elements of the 
radical antislavery ideal into their party platform, the Republicans made 
compromise on slavery impossible. 
 
The Randall-Ramsdell synthesis theory is exemplary of the central element of 
the revisionist school, however not all revisionists and their post-revisionist 
detractors are as intensely sectional in emphasizing the role of the Republicans 
in the failure of compromise. Indeed, it is not necessarily just the Republican’s 
fault for refusing to back down from a radical antislavery position, after all, it is 
their moral prerogative and undoubtedly represented the ideology of a 
significant number of Northerners.103  Southern congressmen also engaged in 
political discourse through abstraction, although instead of slavery it is state’s 
rights and the Southern interpretation of the Constitution that are expressed in 
dualistic rhetoric.104 This inclusive viewpoint is made evident in Craven’s 
reading of Lincoln and Stephen’s correspondence. He reads Lincoln’s letter to 
Alexander H. Stephens as a manifestation of Republican implacability at worst 
and a gross oversimplification at best.105 However he also views Stephens’ 
reply as reductionist, but instead of reducing the issue of resolving sectional 
differences to slavery he takes it back to the unconstitutionality of the 
Republicans in interfering with ‘men’s private opinions’ in regards to slavery.106 
To Craven this exchange is evidential of the manner in which Americans from 
above and below the Mason-Dixon Line had adopted intractable, opposing 
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ideals in the political realm.107 This is the end result of a decade of increased 
radicalism in the North and a coalescence of a defensive culture in the South.108 
Indeed, Southerners were more open to secession in 1860 than they were in 
1833 or 1850 precisely because they were reacting to aggressive Northern 
attitudes rather than a sectional, different, yet valid, approach to how the Union 
should progress.109 Synthesis through compromise was not possible when the 
leading ideology of the North was steadfast in opposing the basis of Southern 
society, even when the realities of slavery itself had little to do with the 
preservation of the Union.110 Therefore even though the South became 
embroiled in the culture of abstractions just as much as the North did, the 
ascendance of Southern radical thought is interpreted by the revisionists as a 
response to the overt, antagonistic antislavery sentiment of the North that 
became more and more enshrined in American politics. 
 
Fundamental Ambiguity 
To be involved in American politics in the first half of the nineteenth century 
meant to take part in public debates, arguing the potential benefits and 
downsides of any issue and reaching an informed synthesis that was best for 
the majority. Santayana attests to this fundamental element of the American 
spirit: ‘Americans love debate; they love sitting round a table as if in 
consultation, even . . . .when each of the participants listens only to his own 
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remarks and votes according to his party.’111 Indeed, a love of fervent, public 
politics is one fundamental American ideal that is truly unambiguous. For how 
could American citizens fully engage in the democratic process if they did not 
know what the congressmen representing them stood for, or if their opinions 
were being accurately represented? This is why ‘A public man must show 
himself in public, even if not to [his] advantage.’112 Alexander H. Stephens did 
not choose to speak before the Georgia Legislature in the early days of the 
Secession Crisis. He spoke at the people of Georgia’s behest; they desired to 
hear his views on secession and, even though he was not a congressman at 
this point, he fulfilled his duty as an American politician by obliging them.113 
Stephens believed in the Union. But he also believed in the citizens of Georgia. 
He was not a fire-eater proclaiming secession from the supposed shackles of 
the federal government. Yet if Georgia felt that its economic interests, ideology, 
and very way of life were being threatened by the antislavery policies of the 
Republicans, then he would support it with the entirety of his being.114 The 
citizens of Georgia did indeed feel this way, as indicated by the overwhelming 
vote in favour of secession in the Legislature, 208 to 89.115 Therefore although 
Stephens would continue to support the Union, he could also faithfully serve 
Georgia, and the Confederacy that it would later join, in seceding from the 
United States.116  
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Presenting his views for public debate did not advance Stephens’ cause, in fact 
it harmed it. The same can be said of John J. Crittenden and Thomas Corwin; 
regardless of their motives, both of their compromises failed. This was partially 
due to the vagaries of party politics. However it was not as simple as 
congressmen ignoring the issue at hand and voting in the name of sectional 
interests. After all, the issue they were attempting to resolve was not a minor 
matter, it was the preservation of the Union.  So why did compromise fail during 
the Secession Crisis? Again, this question cannot be definitively answered by 
this paper. The main strands in historiography offer two potential answers in the 
irreconcilable differences and moral abstraction theories. Both are plausible, 
and not necessarily incompatible. For they are united by the idea of the 
Northern and Southern sections developing different definitions of progress and 
liberty that were ultimately proven irreconcilable. The fundamental ambiguity of 
slavery in the Constitution allowed for these definitions to evolve alongside each 
other and the spirit of American democracy allowed for them to be debated and 
compromised over, for a time. However,  
‘A certain vagueness of soul, together with a great gregariousness and 
tendency to be moulded by example and by prevalent opinion, is requisite for 
feeling free under liberty. You must find the majority right enough to live with; 
you must give up lost causes; you must be willing to put your favourite notions 
to sleep in the family cradle of convention.’117  
Neither the fire-eaters nor the radical Republicans were willing to give up their 
respective views on slavery. And although the majority of Americans were not 
radicals, radical thought undoubtedly influenced the political and social climate 
                                            
117 Santayana, Character & Opinion in the United States, p. 122 
38 
 
in the decade leading up to the Civil War. This, combined with the opposing 
interpretations of liberty made possible by the fundamental ambiguity of the 
Constitution, made an enduring American compromise all but impossible during 
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